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undertaken by individuals, groups and societies.
To a unique extent, human goods are frequently intangible; this is the primary source of all human studies: economics, history, literature, law, ethics, and so on. Their intangibility should not mislead us into thinking that they are infinitely malleable according to our whims and preferences. A theory of economics or a law may be workable or otherwise in just the same way as a tangible good such as an elect ric motor. For t his reaso n, the humanities have leg itimate claims as fields o f science and engineering. But t hey must not betray the r esponsibility that co mes with this realisation by departing from the spirit of the scientific enterprise, which has as its foundation accountability to the tr ut hs abou t u niver sal r ealit y.
In this analysis, ethics is the realm that connects individual human nature to societal realities such as laws. It does so in various conceptual dimensions. In the domain of willed action it recognises tha t hu man beings a re neither infallible nor omniscient , and therefore canno t give effe ct to all their plans; and so, there must be a realm of unenforced obligation between what is compulsory (law) and what is completely free (personal preferences). In the realm of planning and understanding, ethics is the connective between the realities of individual human nature and those of social organisation. These are processes of mutual influence and feedback determined by reality, whether we understand that reality or not. But if it is understood, or understood better than before, new possibilities ar e opened for positively influencing human so cial and individual evolution.
The Principle of Goodness is a new realist ethical theory which acknowledges these truths about human nature and the vast web of interactions within which humans live and exercise their wills. It has a great deal to say about how people should act, and in turn be treated by others. It shows that contemporary socio-political theory is wholly inadequate as a suitable basis for human flourishing: in par ticular , t he fas hiona ble co mpulsion t o redu ce t he varieg ated u nique ness of each o f the six billion human individuals to generalised properties based upon categories within which they are placed, such as r ace, cla ss, and g ende r. Not o ne o f the se catego ries sta nds u p to a crit ical analysis of its usefulness as a means of dividing people from each other. The result is that many people are treated unjustly, the consequences to their lives disregarded; and yet the ideal society eludes usas it must because these categories are no t grounded in reality. I n this paper we fo cus on the human individual. We invest igate ho w the t rust and sense of security that follows from treat ing every single one ethically as individuals will be conducive to the development of positive feedback cycles of car e, co ncern, friendship, and compassion throughout the matrix of human interact ion. The challenge, then, for those who desire a world free of inequity, conflict and insecurity is to re-examine every social field informed by this ethics, which is grounded in the inescapable reality of the human condition.
Introduction
Our main task in this paper is t o explore some basic pro pert ies of an et hical theory discovered by the authors, and tentatively called the Principle of Goodness. (We use the term "discovered", as we feel it is arg uable tha t t he insight s of t his theo ry long pred ate our not ice o f the m, and under lie many of the major religious and ethical schools of thought; but they have been assumed, or 'intuited', rather than put into an explicit wo rd for mula. This is explo red in [House 2005] .) The the ory might convenie ntly be termed 'process-rea list', mea ning t hat the terms "G oo d" and "evil" occurring in the statement of the theory are claimed to be realities, not of matter or other substance, but of consistent patterns within processes involving moral act ors and ot her sent ient beings. This 'process nature' is explored in the other paper to be presented at this conference, [House & House 2005] .
If one surveys how people would like the world to be, one typically finds that altruistic answers dominate the rest, answers such as: a world at peace; equity and justice; no discrimination or prejudice; no more hungry, sick, illiterate or poor; safety; the opportunity to lead happy lives; free dom to pur sue opportunit ies fo r cr eat ivity and prosperity; op portunit ies t o assist ot hers in fields such as health, education, economics, arts, music, human understanding, etc.; and other similarly benevolent ideals. (Example: [MORI 1999 ].) On the other hand, general opinion has sometimes been strongly in favour of destructive policies, such as war (for example, at the time for the cru sades). Cle arly, two t ende ncies are opera tive in human being s, a nd it is reaso nable to posit that either o f these could be enhanced in a cycle o f positive r einforcement. To take the destruct ive examp le, had cont inuo us vic to ry and pro sperity follo wed from the cru sades, we might r easona bly expect that even greater public support for those policies would have followed. We are concerned here with the other, positive example, specifically in the context of the Principle of Goodness. Although here we can do little more than investigate likelihoods and show some connections, we can advance the Principle of Goodness in the sense of a scientific hypotheses, in that, should its recommendations be followed , we wo uld see ho w well they wo rked. (But see the very important proviso at the end of our other paper.)
One naturally questions whether such deserves the appellation "scientific". It is perhaps fundamental of the humanities that at their co re are intangibles: the nat ure o f human beings and t he outworking of that nature in human societies. Other intellectual fields have greater access to 'concretes', measurables that can be used to judge success or failure of theory. For example, econo mics has numerical measures o f the behaviour of the eco nomy, and physical science has t he referent of clear-cut results of experiments upon the physical world. This difference is unfortunate, for the importance of the knowledge of the humanities is equally great, but is too often overlooked in 'real world' decisions in areas such as law, government policy, development, and so on, due to its relative uncertainty. We would assert in general, and also in defence of the procedure recommended here, that theories in the humanities can indeed be called scientific, provided that the scientific method of hypothesis and testing is followed, and provided the inherently greater uncertainty is acknowledged. In this understanding, we would see that there is a real meaning to the "hard" in "hard sciences", but that "soft sciences" fully deserve to be called sciences. We try to make a st art at building so me co nnectio ns in t he et hical fie ld that one hop es would be u seful in this connection.
Situation of Personal Ethics.
One function of personal ethics is to structure the realm between complete freedom and laws. Not everything that is permissible is admirable, or even acceptable (to one's social groups or t o one's own bet ter judgement). Individuals reasonably ask fo r greater guidance than the cont ent of the nation's statute books, whether as unspoken social mores or as explicit moral or ethical principles. Much disagreement exists as to ho w, or even if, this should be d one (fo r example po litical and religious ideologies, group opinion, other ethical systems such as utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, practical reasonableness, virtue ethics, and so on). By pointing to some likely consequences of widespread choice of the Principle of Goodness as a social and personal guide, we hope to provide reaso ns for its practicability as a good ethical philosophy. However, the choice of an et hics to live by is not necessarily an either-or proposition, and connections amongst ethical theories can strengthen the justification for 'believing in' ethics itself as a genuine subject for investigation rather than as a widespread ("Nietzschean") mistake.
We can elucidate these points after introducing the Principle for which we are arguing.
The Principle of Goodness
A brief statement of this principle is that:
Goodness is to attempt to benefit everyone; evil is to attempt to harm any innocent one.
The Principle does not refer to non-ethical meanings of these two words, such as profit, welfare, fortune, and so on, although connections amongst these various meanings are obvious. Indeed, many of the no n-ethical meanings pro vide cont ent for the terms "benefit" and "harm" in the statement above. Thus we might say that (moral) good is to try to provide (practical) good to everyone. Nevertheless, the meanings are distinct, and the Principle does not concern (or say anything abou t) outcomes , but instead r efer s to mental st ates, tha t is, the sta te of no t merely wishing, or even intending, but actually attempting, to promote the welfare of all (in the case of goodness) or to harm any innocent (in the case of evil). The attempt might not be action, however. Refraining from a harmful course might be part of an intent ion to promote benefit, or refraining from a po ssible saving actio n might be pa rt of an at tempt to cause ha rm.
This has consequences for how this theory is assessed. Evaluation of practical success depends on practical questions, such as whether a certain act really did benefit or harm certain people, or was the best or worst cho ice. But evaluating an ethical act, according to the theory, is not assessed by the actual outcome, but by the beliefs and intentions of the moral actor. Of course, the actor's knowledge and capacities are themselves the products of other, prior, att empts, such as whether the person bothered to collect relevant information, or obtain equipment that was clearly needed for performing a certain task; in this sense, pract ical failure to achieve benefit or avo id harm might indeed be regarded as ethical failure, but only because other, enabling, attempts were not themselves conducted to the best of the actor's abilities. This is why, for example, we often excuse children for some acts that are held culpable in adults, even though in both cases the right action might have been impossible due to lack of knowledge. ( [Hursthouse] )
We can understand the theory bett er by considering a po ssible misunderst anding. Because t he theory refers to an end result (either benefiting all or not harming an innocent), it may be mistaken for a consequentialist theory such as utilitarianism. When we say that our theory refers to mental stat es involved in at tempt s, rather than to outcomes, the utilitarian might respond t hat so , to o, he believes t hat a perso n in a real situation can do not hing else t han att empt to pro duc e the o verall maximum happiness, and should not be condemned for factors outside their control that change the outcome. An example might clarify the distinction. Suppose a villain threatens me that, unless I murder Jane, he will murder all of Jane's family, Jane included; and let us suppo se that there is no 'way out' o f our dile mma by foiling the villain some how , and there ar e no 'long term' count erbalancing consequences such as ar e often posited by ut ilitarian analyses t o change the obvious 'right choice' under that theory. A consequentialist would probably have to agree that I should kill Jane, as that leads to the least damaging overall outcome. (Utilitarian counterarguments to such scenarios are considered by [Finnis] , and disposed of successfully, in our opinion.)
Under the Principle of Goodness, however, no such conclusion follows, even though not doing as the villain demands results in a worse or equally bad outcome for every single person involved. I might or might not believe that to kill Jane in these circumstances is to attempt to harm Jane. (I might not believe it if I regard my actions as being completely determined by the greater threat.) And if I do no t kill Jane, t hen, kno wing what I do about the villain's intent ions, I might or might not believe t hat refraining from killing J ane is t o at temp t t o kill her ent ire family, Jane include d. I f I believe the fo rmer but not the latter, the n I must not kill Jane! -even if I know full well that all Jane 's family will die. On t he o the r hand, if I believe t hat bot h act ions will har m, but t hat neither is an att empt by me to harm, then I have no action or no n-act ion available that do es no har m. I have failed to find a non-harming behaviour. Something will happen based on what I do next, and I might even resort to counting numbers to decide what that something is. If I kill Jane to avoid her family's deaths, I have failed, but have not deliberately chosen evil. But I still cannot argue that killing Jane was the 'right' thing to do; it is failing ethically, even if that failure might be excusable. There is another similar scenario that makes the difference more stark. Suppose that, instead of threatening to kill Jane's family, the villain threatens to kill Bill's family. Now the numbers do not count ; Jane's death, if I accede to t he villain, will be of my choosing, whereas Bill's family's deaths will not be. Choosing Jane's death is t o do evil, and I should no t attempt to r ationalise anything else. Now Socrates' point is unavoidable: evil might be done, but it should not be done through me! Of course, in reality, where we can't assume that the villain will certainly carry out any threat, no one's death is certain and that reinforces the reason to refuse to kill Jane in either scenario. Again, this key difference between consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories is discussed at length by [Finnis] .
Just one mor e clarificatio n is needed. The abo ve is not a quest ion of act ion versus inaction. If the villain threatened an air cont roller t o not warn a plane of a co nflicting movement (thus allowing the plane to crash) or else the villain would do some much greater harm, the controller cannot use the fact that his choice is an inaction as a relevant fact or. The relevant fact or is what one understands as an attempt.
The above concerns extreme cases. In large measure we have been trained in our 'bottom-line' soc iety to measure things by t heir effects, and w e must be war e of judg ing an ethic by o utcome alone, w hich is t he de finitio n of o ne pa rticular et hic and is almost to gra nt t he victo ry to t hat ethic at the outset. We now turn to other matters that promise to show matters in a very different light.
Relationships amongst Ethical Theories.
We mentioned that the Principle only concerns ethical meanings of words such as "good". Other meanings of these words have a valid place in ethical theories, for obvious reasons; nevertheless, invalid conflation of these two senses has occurred; consequentialism might be interpreted as assert ing that the co nflation is always valid. Another, perhaps more subt le, distinct ion (creating t he possibility of making a subtle mistake) is between kinds of ethical theories themselves, based on what the theory is trying to achieve. We might distinguish at least these three kinds of theories (not intending to be exhaustive): a) theories that define one or more key ethical terms and deduce ethical behaviours from them, or claim to have found the basis for ethics somewhere (Hume's 'passions', utilitarianism, Kantian ethics), or alternatively deny the possibility of doing so (Nietzschean denial of ethics); b) scientific theories (areas in cognitive science, neuroscience, behavioural genetics, evolutionary biology, and evolutionary psychology), which explain the causes of ethical behaviour, such as being selected for by evolution as the behaviour of beings most likely to reproduce and pass on tendencies for similar behaviour to offspring; c) the ories t hat rec ommend an e thical syst em for so me re aso n(s) , pe rhaps a pur pose o r go al, whilst not advancing some foundational source of ethics, but rather appealing for credence to the suitability of the entire system to achieve its goals (Confucianism; Aristotelian ethics, and in particular [MacIntyre]'s modern redevelopment and adaptation of it).
It is clear that each category can contain divergent ethical theories, and so the above does not classify theories by the similarity of their recommendations. Indeed, category (b) refers to theories without recommendations (in the theories themselves, although some scholars might write moral commentary on such a basis).
Where does the Principle of Goodness fit in? At first sight, it seems to fall in category (a), as it sets out a statement of two key ethical terms and promises to derive other things such as rules of behaviour from these. However, it is a realist theory. It asserts that the statements of the theory are chosen in the hope that they accord with certain realities, consistencies and patterns, that can be understood as moral, such as kindness, care, love, and compassion, in human individuals, and justice, fraternity, friendship, and social concern in societies. That is, the hypothesis is that following the Principle produces or tends to produce, individuals and societies of such natures. In other words, it is also a theory related to those in category (b). But can we argue every decision from the basics for every judgement we, or society might make? Derivation of secondary ethical principles, such as honesty and other virtues, seems to be necessary, implying that activity belonging in category (c) will need to be undertaken as part of elaborating a practical moral understanding.
We thus see that in fact, these categories are not mutually exclusive: more than one ethical theory can be "in the right" in some sense, for reaso ns other than those considered by [Smith] , who addresses only the nature of virtue and the contents of praiseworthy character (Part VI section I). It may even be that some theories in different catego ries might in fact be closely related o r lend each ot her support, but t hat this not be o bviou s due to t he very diffe rent ways in which t heo ries in these different categories are explicat ed. We can easily see this with theories in catego ries (b) and (c) : if human behavio ur is moulded to some deg ree by inst inctive de terminants, the n we w ould expect that a well-developed ethical system might knowingly or unknowingly take these into account somehow.
Category (a) seems to be the odd one out. The reason is that it appears to favour a deductivist approach, first establishing the core principle(s) and then deducing everything from there. Since
Hume, it has been hard to argue for any but a deductive approach to any question. (Witness [Popper] 's theory of scientific falsifiability, an explicit acceptance of Hume's idea.) But we need not take this category to imply deductivism. Utilitarianism seems to gain its justification from an appeal to judge the intuitive rightness of its foundational principle, not from any necessary reason tha t it should be true. Furthe r, we ha ve [Freder ick L. Will]'s t wo boo ks t hat lay a so lid groundwork for justifying and understanding truth in other than strict deductivist terms. Rather tha n acc ept supposedly-invio late foundational principles and what ever we can de duc e fro m them, we can instead look at the totality of a logical pattern (an argument, or a complete system of thought, such as an ethical theory) and evaluate it in its totality, including everything from its assumptions, internal logic, and external evidence. Now category (a) is starting to resemble (b) and (c). The important point here is that a grounding assumption (such as our Principle) might act as the st arting point for deduction witho ut implying a belief in solely deductive reasons for accepting conclusions, or, indeed, the entire enterprise. As powerful confirmation (the word is used advisedly) of this, we may point t o [Stove] 's meticulous analysis and criticism of Hume's inductive scepticism.
Composing a Synthesis
At t he st art of his boo k on a revised Aristo telian virtue et hics, [MacIntyre] p ose s for us t he cla im that there has been a degeneration in the understanding of ethics; over the past few hundred years, broken theories have replaced an earlier, sounder, Aristotelian ethics. ("We possess indeed simula cra of mo rality, we c ont inue to use many o f the ke y expres sions. But we have -ve ry largely, if not entirely -lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality." (p2)) Certainly the case for current theories being disordered is at the least plausible: MacIntyre argues that the co mbination of Kant (denying non-rational bases for morality), Hume (denying reasons not based on the passions), and Kierkegaard (insisting on criterionless fundamental choice) effectively removes any reasonable way to defend morality as understood in modernity. (p49) He holds that the only rat ional alter natives ar e either the Niet zschean diagnosis o r relinquishing t he entire "E nlightenment p roject ". (p118) Be that as it may, MacInt yre clearly fails in establishing the other part of his thesis, that Aristotelian ethics is the forgotten sounder theory that the modern world retains only in fragmentary, semi-understood forms. He is affronted that Aristotle took what he regards as the clearly mistaken course of "writing off" "non-Greeks, barbarians, and slaves" (pp 158,159) . But in what sense can Aristotle's ethics be better than that of even the most untutored modern, if his system cannot warn him of the wrongness of excluding members of these groups?
Per haps Arist ot le overlo oked some a spect of his own syst em that should ha ve wa rned him, but if so, MacIntyre doesn't tell us, apart from an inconclusive mention of Aristotle's failure to appreciate the importance of historical factors. MacIntyre has made important clarifications to Aristotelian ethics with his explication of "practices" and the distinction between reasons that are internal and external to these practices, and understanding virtues in this context. ("A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevent us from achieving any such goods.") From this basis, he is able to show that the system does indeed 'hang together'. But even so, MacIntyre does not, and apparently can not, tell us what Aristotle could have or should have understood about virtue to be warned about the evils of slavery. If we need to appeal to our existing intuitive feelings to recognise such a huge evil, it is hard to see why such theories should be regarded as complete ethical systems. ( [Miller] raises one possibility, Aristotle's distinction between unjust and just governments, the latter aiming at the common advantage. But the facility with which he introduces distinctions that reduce or remove consideration from slaves, women, etc., shows that nothing in his ethics protects this principle from undermining.)
We propose that the Pr inciple of Goo dness pr ovides t he 'bot tom layer' underlying any sound ethical system. Starting with the Principle, we may deduce or infer other ethical rules, such as principles of honesty, fair dealing, generosity, kindness, and so on. Or we could start at the other end, performing an analysis of virtue in MacIntyre's style and developing a system. These projects can meet when the Principle is used to inform the system, to give it pegs to hang upon, and thus prevent it drooping into ethically bad judgements, such as permitting slavery. Indeed, the reason the Principle prohibits slavery is so obvious we can dispense with wasting words on it here. But more subtle questions can be addressed. For example, we may employ such considerations to analyse Aristo tle's discussion (Nichomachean Ethics Book III, 1.) o f particular kinds of ignorance (universal and particular) and their culpability. That is, when Aristotle says we are excused for ignorance of particulars but not of universals, we may argue that the reason is that in dealing with particulars, the chain of moral attempts that led to the situation under discussion was short, or consisted of only the moral act in question. But in the case of universals, ignorance of them was the product of morally faulty attempts during much of one's life history, leading eventually to one's ignorance and incapability to act for the best at the crucial time.
We would see virtues in general to partake of this nature, that is, summaries of ethical complexities that could in pr inciple be 'taken apart' and explained in terms of 'mor al building blocks', the myriad occasions, great and small, during a lifetime, in which one had to choose how to act , whether for goodness, fo r evil, or for neither (not ing t hat our st atement s of g oo d and evil do not toget her cover all possible attempts). In this sense the Principle o f Goodness is a different kind of rationale for the virtues than that employed by Aristotle, which is essentially utilitarian (enlightened happiness). T his fact is two-sided. On the one hand, it holds out t he hope that the Principle of Goodness (if it is a good ethical theory) is more consistently reliable than principles ident ified by a n op era tio nal theo ry, t hese in the et hical c ase being qua lities (virtues) supposedly possessing inherent merit (as, for example, in "Honesty is the best policy."). To t ake Aristotle's above-mentioned claim, one might construct a scenario in which knowledge of a universal was truly beyond a person's capacity and therefore ignorance of it should be blameless, or where knowledge of a particular should have been obtainable had the actor behaved morally at earlier occasions thr ougho ut life. A legal syst em co uld be imagine d that used Aristo tle's rule as a ba sis for assigning culpability in criminal cases, with real conseq uences fo r an accused; and yet the Principle of Goo dnes s sho ws t hat this rule is only 'usu ally so und'. Reco gnit ion o f the Principle in such a co urt would allow the r ule to be employed when, and o nly when, it succeeds in making t he distinction Aristotle discussed.
We agree that pre-analysing virtue and forming theor ies about it (withou t suggesting that any par ticular exist ing t heo ry is a good or a bad one ) might provide a 'ready guide' for quick actio n in complicated cases w here one do esn't ha ve t ime to conside r every r eleva nt fa ct. Bu t ha ving said that, in the case of t he Principle o f Goodness, doing a sufficient, if not a full, analysis is likely to be much easier than it would be for a utilitarian, as far-flung consequences, under the Principle, cannot affect the evil of an act that is known to harm the innocent here and now, whereas under utilitarian theories, all kinds of remote consequences have to be considered. ( [Finnis] ) There is every prospect, then, that a virtue t heory can be based on the Principle of Goodness. Then we may ask of such a system whether it acco rds with the requirement that it be lived by human beings, restricted in some ways by instinctive human nature; that is, we allow evolutionary psychology and other scientific fields to inform our theory and refine it further. Evolutionary psychology sees ethical behaviour as one among many outcomes of evolutionary processes, positing, fo r example, t hat just as fit ness for rep roduc tio n selected fo r excellent hear ing in insectivo rous ba ts, so t oo it se lect ed fo r fee lings a nd lo yaltie s that are commonly called "ethical" in humans and per haps ot her higher animals. Evo lutionary theo ries of ethics are inherently explanatory rather than prescriptive ( [Wright] Ch 16), as a necessary consequence of the empirical nature of the scientific enterprise. But when such investigations show us such things as that human beings desire to excel, to possess social status, to see their children prosper, we can take such findings into account and find ways in which they can do so in many different ways (arts, sciences, athletics, politics, business, and so on).
Commencing the Ethical Program
Bearing all the abo ve in mind , we want to loo k at some immediate conseq uenc es o f the Principle for the individual. From evolutionary biology, one finding is pivotal: adaptations are adaptive for individuals, not for populations. (See [ Williams] .) And the Principle of Goodness co ncerns individuals: a mor al obligatio n attaches t o every individual and concerns every individual. The Principle thus leads us to identify a major moral mistake, which might as well have a name, so we call it categorism. This is the lumping of individuals into categories and treating them, not as individuals, but as representatives of their category. By this we do not mean the making of relevant d istinct ions . The set of p eople w ho d o no t intend t o pay fo r merch andise is a ca tegory, but it is one to the members of which a shopkeeper is entitled to deny the supply of goods. However, categories such as a sex, a race, a nation, and so on, are often or usually irrelevant to moral concern. Tokenism, the filling of committees and so on, with members of selected categories, is profoundly futile once one remembers the huge diversity within categories, a diversity that has a deep, scientifically established basis.
Note that we are not here trying to take 'moral lessons' from science; rather, we are using science to gain knowledge about ourselves and other organisms on our planet. The ethical content comes from the Principle of Goodness. Indeed, as many have observed, natural processes contain a great deal that can be considered evil, if viewed morally. Nevertheless, being able to include facts about our nature in ethical theories must surely make the latter more effective. Beginning with the most fundamental results, that we are sent ient beings, and our pleasure/pain faculties evolved in making our ancestors reproductively effective, proceeding to complex and unexpected findings, we note that this has immediate connection to the Principle of Goodness, as these help provide content for the terms "benefit" and "harm".
The ado ption o f the Principle, even by a single individual, has immediat e co nseq uenc es fr om t his perspective for all those who interact with them: they have nothing to fear from those individuals, unles s they themselves commence ho stilit ies o f some sor t. Indeed, t he ad opter of the Principle will try to inculcat e a feeling of beneficence to wards all, and will naturally attempt t o understand the causes of others' troubles. As [Smith] put it (Sect I Chap II): "But whatever may be the cause of sympathy, o r however it may be excited, nothing pleases us more t han to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emot ions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much sho cked as by the appearance of the contrary. ... How are the unfortunate relieved when they have found our a perso n to whom they can communicate the cause o f their so rrow?"
All aspect s of o ur invest igat ion can no w be s een t o converg e. T he Principle is a ctually a twin directive, one of universal beneficence, namely that the most praiseworthy state is none other than to work for the benefit of everyone, and one of non-harm, that is, never at tempt to harm anyone who has not by t heir own actions in some way forced a contr ary course upon one. One who pract ices these, or a society that practices them, must inculcat e a sense of safety and value in the recipient of this concern. This is a fact testified to from scientific findings and from inspection of one's own moral sentiments, much as Smith did in the above passage.
But we need science as a reality check. If we desire a world of peace and friendship, flourishing, care, compatibility with the environment and non-human life, then we need to also be warned about the things within our own natur es that might interfere with ou r pro gram. T he elephant in the room, the obvious question about the Principle, arising from evolutionary considerations, is that the latter show why we naturally have greater concern and tend to be more altruistic towards those more closely related to us; yet t he Principle t ells us to try to benefit everyone. Can these be reconciled?
Firstly, we note that "everyone" includes ourselves and our close relatives. We are not being asked to be alt ruistic (at least, not in genera l, alt hou gh, like every ot her ethical t heo ry, t he Principle enco unt ers situ ations wher e alt ruism is calle d for). Seco ndly, it is s trictly rat ional in ethical t erms for us to be most concerned about ourselves, less so about those close to us (often our biological relatio ns) and so on. This is because we are usually in the best po sition to know how t o and be able to benefit ourselves, then our closest, and so on decreasingly. To see the reason, suppose someone decides to starve in order to give everything they have to the poor. Others who follow the Principle must be concerned about this foolish but innocent person, and will then feel obliged to divert effort from their other beneficial projects in order to stop the foolish one from dying of starvation. Such po intless self-neg lect in fact causes tro uble and loss for o thers. Therefore one should have concern for one's self and one's near ones, as that is usually the way to cause the least trouble for others who also act morally. Finally, we may note that being most concerned for one's self is not the same as being selfish. For example, one might enter a business deal primarily for reasons of personal advancement, and yet still ensure that everyone else (partners, clients, customers, employees, the community, the environment) also benefit generously. To put it another way, in evo lutionary terms, all t hat is requir ed fo r us to rep roduc e is t hat we effect ively help ourselves and our nearest and dearest. But caring for others in distant places is an option open to us by virtue o f our flexible minds, a nd so ado pting an ethics t hat asks us to do so is per fect ly feasible, and in fact is not even onerous. Despite the apparent altruism in being asked to try to benefit everyone, t he Princ iple is not in co nflict wit h huma n psycho log y.
Much more analysis needs to be done to firmly establish this conclusion, but it must surely be clear that explanatory theories do not inherently detract from any ethical philosophy that attempts to persuade us of rules as to how we should act. On the contrary, the latter are given an extra resource ( the findings of evolutionary investigations of behaviou r) to use to t est ethical rules and practices according to chosen criteria. Indeed, from the perspective of process reality as discussed in our o ther paper, evolutionar y studies o f ethics but tress our assumpt ion that realities in patterns of cause and effect underlie moral language and give meaning to words such as "good" and "evil", and that it is therefore quite reasonable to ask (and not merely in a private sense) "What do these words mean?" Although such patterns are likely unrecognised and perhaps too complex to ever recognise in full (and this is part of the unique challenge and difficulty of the humanities), we might hope t hat careful statistical work within the evolutionary psycho logy framewo rk can show the exist ence of so me of the m.
Where to from Here?
We have ident ified three kinds of et hical theories, t wo that at tempt to d evelop ethical systems, and one that is purely explanatory of the existence and nature of ethical tendencies. In our category (a), (loosely) theories positing a source for ethical truth, we can consider the Principle of Goodness as another competing candidate. In catego ry (c) ( loosely) attempts t o set up coherent systems of ethical practice, we can consider it to be an underlying source of ethical guidance to correct and adjust such theories, to 'keep them on track' (such as by pointing out the evil of slavery). Whichever way we view the Principle, category (b), scientific investigations, provides warnings of limitations and notice of opportunities that are open to our species.
We may now proceed by developing the Principle acco rding to either a cat egor y (a) or (c) plan. The (a) plan wo uld develop ethical underst anding afresh from the Principle, and see where t he effort leads us. Ethical concepts such as virtues would be developed anew under this plan. To see the kind of thing this implies, take our previous example: Is honest y rea lly, always , t he be st policy? Clea rly not, because an honest action can quite feasibly be part o f a plan to harm someone; a perso n uninterested in truth for any moral reason might need it t o more effectively plan har m and destruction, and honestly giving them the recipe for an atomic bomb might be nothing more than an att empt t o furt her such a plan. The Principle does no t recognise that virtues possess any inherent merit that isolates them from moral scrutiny, that makes them somehow the 'right thing to do' despite their damage in particular cases. Any value a virtue has, it has in consequence of its use in furtherance of avoiding harm or attempting benefit. Our other paper at t his conference is a first ste p in fo llowing thro ugh this pro gra m.
The other useful pro gram wo uld be to take existing catego ry (c) systems (such as Arist otelian, Confucian, etc. philosophies) and re-examine them to see whether they are justified in whole or part according to the Principle of Goodness, and to see what additio nal guidance or impro vement can be had by informing the analysis at suitable points.
Whichever way one might pr oceed, the Principle o f Goodness claims to be a realist theory, and reality sometimes surprises o r even disappoint s us. Any of our cherished beliefs or traditions might turn out to need change or even abandonment. Reality is a hard master, and its condition upon us all if we wis h to make progres s in ethics is tha t we have t hat spe cial intellect ual virt ue, humilit y.
